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Abstract: The paper develops a three-sector specific factor model with Harris-Todaro type 
unemployment to examine the consequences of economic recession in the skilled sector on the 
informal sector workforce. It finds that while a decrease in the price of high-skill commodity 
raises both the informal (rural) sector wage and unemployment of unskilled labour, a drop in 
emigration of skilled labour produces exactly the opposite effects. The effects of these policies 
on the welfare of unskilled workers in terms of the welfare measure of Sen (1974) have also been 
studied. The paper recommends a protectionist policy to the unskilled labour-intensive sector for 
protecting the interest of the vulnerable section of the working population.  
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Economic Recession and Informal Sector Workers 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The financial and economic crisis that started in 2008 has deep implications for employment 
across the world. While the precise consequences cannot be predicted, it appears certain that both 
jobs and wage levels will suffer in many developing countries. The crisis is underscoring the 
relevance of the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda. As per the annual Global Employment Trends 
report (2009) of the ILO the global economic crisis could result in an additional 18 million 
unemployed in the world and increased levels of vulnerable people in employment. 
  
The economic crisis is bound to produce a significant impact on the informal sector which has 
emerged as an important institution in the entire developing world. It is beyond any doubt that 
the informal sector plays a very significant role in employment in developing countries 
constituting at least 70 per cent of total employment of the working population (Agenor 1996). In 
case of India this figure is over 90 per cent if one includes agriculture.  
 
Labour market theory suggests an increase in informal activities as a result of economic turmoil, 
since informal employment can act as a buffer when people are laid off in the formal sector and 
need to find new job opportunities. Furthermore, an economy going into recession might 
experience a shift from the tradable to the non-tradable sectors, which again would strengthen 
informality. Empirical evidences from Latin American countries like Argentina and many Asian 
countries support the predicted shift towards more informal employment.  
 
The economic crisis that originated in developed countries affects the developing economies in a 
number of ways. The fall in the imports of the developed nations from developing countries has 
spelt gloom. Consequent decline in commodity prices have resulted in lower export earnings, 
which left the latter countries high and dry. Developing countries which depend on primary and 
processed products are hit hard. Countries like India and China that are large exporters of high-
skill commodities like computer software are facing serious problem due to decreased demand 
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from developed countries resulting in lower prices for these products. For India, it is even a 
bigger problem because India is the land of IT outsourcing and a lot of large western companies 
outsource their IT services to Indian companies. So, it is obvious that the supply of works for 
Indian outsourcing companies will suffer until the crisis gets over.  
 
Falling demand, collapsing commodity prices and the international credit crunch are all 
impacting most heavily on the world’s poorest countries and thus on hundreds of millions of 
people who are already poverty stricken. The ILO (2009) report also said that in this scenario 
some 200 million workers, mostly in developing economies, could be pushed into extreme 
poverty.  
 
On the other hand, during economic downturns migrant workers in the developed nations are 
often the first to lose their jobs and while some may well choose to return home, policies aimed 
at sending migrant workers home tend to be based on the perception that “migrants take jobs” or 
“compete for welfare benefits”. More restrictive immigration policies are adopted to protect the 
local labour market and in response to a demand for fewer foreign workers.  For example, a 
reduction in the number of migrants to be admitted for employment has already been announced 
in some countries (Italy, U.K.) or is under discussion in others (e.g. U.S. and Australia).  In 
Spain, the Government has introduced financial incentives to encourage unemployed migrants to 
return home. Such protectionist policies on the part of the rich nations accentuate the miseries of 
the developing economies.  
 
Under the circumstances, the present paper is designed to examine the consequences of 
economic recession on the unskilled labour market in a developing economy. This is important 
because unskilled workers constitute the most vulnerable group of the working population. In 
particular the effects of a decline in the world price of a high-skill commodity and a fall in 
emigration of skilled labour will be examined on the informal wage, unemployment and welfare 
of unskilled workers. A three-sector Harris-Todaro (1970) (HT hereafter) type of model has been 
employed for the purpose of the analysis. While a decrease in the price of high-skill commodity 
raises both the informal (rural) sector wage and unemployment of unskilled labour, a drop in 
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emigration of skilled labour produces exactly the opposite effects. In order to protect its 
vulnerable group of workers the country should fall back upon the protectionist policy and resort 
a price subsidy policy to the unskilled labour-intensive (informal) sector which is expected to 
produce an unequivocal improvement in welfare of the poor unskilled workers.  
 
 
2. The Model 
  
We consider a small open dual economy consisting of three sectors: rural, low-skill 
manufacturing and high-skill sectors. The last two are urban sectors. The rural sector (sector 1) 
produces an agricultural commodity by using unskilled labour, capital and land. The urban low-
skill sector (sector 2) produces its output with the help of unskilled labour and capital. Finally, 
sector 3 produces a high-skill commodity by means of skilled labour and capital. So, land and 
skilled labour are specific to sectors 1 and 3, respectively while capital is perfectly mobile among 
all the three sectors of the economy. On the other hand, unskilled labour is imperfectly mobile 
between the rural and low-skill urban sectors. Sector 2 faces a unionized labour market where 
unskilled workers receive a contractual wage, *W , while the unskilled wage rate in the rural 
sector, ,W is market determined. The two wage rates are related by the Harris-Todaro (1970) 
condition of migration equilibrium where the expected urban wage equals the rural wage rate and 
.* WW   Hence, there is urban unemployment of unskilled labour. Sectors 1 and 3 are the two 
export sectors while sector 2 is the import-competing sector. All the three commodity prices are 
given by the small open economy assumption. Sector 2 uses capital more intensively with 
respect to unskilled labour vis-à-vis sector 1. Production functions exhibit constant returns to 
scale with positive and diminishing marginal productivity to each factor. Finally, commodity 2 is 
chosen as the numeraire. 
 
The following symbols will be used for formal presentation of the model.  
Kia   amount of capital required to produce 1 unit of output in the ith sector, i   1,2,3; 
Nia = amount of land required to produce 1 unit of output in sector 1;  
Lia unskilled labour-output ratio in the ith sector, i   1,2; 
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3Sa  skilled labour-output ratio in sector 3; 
iP exogenously given relative price of the i th commodity, i  = 1,3; 
iX level of output of the i th sector, i   1,2,3; 
SW wage rate of skilled labour; 
*W  unionized unskilled wage in sector 2; 
W competitive wage rate of unskilled labour in sector 1; 
r  return to capital; 
R   return to land; 
L  endowment of unskilled labour; 
S  endowment of skilled labour; 
0S  number of skilled workers migrating to developed countries;  
UL = urban unemployment of unskilled labour; 
K  economy’s aggregate capital stock; 
N   economy’s land endowment; 
ji distributive share of the j th input in the i th sector for j ,N , ,L S K  and i  1, 2, 3; 
ji proportion of the j th input employed in the i th sector for j KL, and i 1,2,3; 
'' proportional change. 
 
Given the perfectly competitive commodity markets the three price-unit cost equality conditions 
relating to the three industries are as follows. 
   
1 1 1 1L K NWa ra Ra P            (1) 
2 2* 1L KW a ra            (2) 
3 3 3S S KW a ra P            (3) 
 
Full utilization of land, capital and skilled labour, respectively, imply 
1 1Na X N            (4) 
1 1 2 2 3 3K K Ka X a X a X K            (5) 
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3 3 0Sa X S S           (6) 
In the migration equilibrium there exists urban unemployment of unskilled labour. The unskilled 
labour endowment equation (after normalizing the endowment to unity) is given by 
1 1 2 2 1L L Ua X a X L            (7) 
 
In an HT framework the unskilled labour allocation mechanism is such that in the labor market 
equilibrium, the rural wage rate, ,W equals the expected wage income in the urban sector. 
Since the probability of finding a job in the urban low-skill manufacturing sector is 
2 2 2 2( / ( ))L L Ua X a X L the expected unskilled wage in the manufacturing sector is 
2 2 2 2( * / ( ))L L UW a X a X L . Therefore, the rural-urban migration equilibrium condition for 
unskilled labour is expressed as 
2 2 2 2( * / ( ))L L UW a X a X L W  , 
or equivalently, 
2 2 1 1
* 1L L
W a X a X
W
            (8) 
 
Using (4) and (6) equations (5) and (8) can be rewritten as follows. 
31
2 2 0
1 3
( )KK K
N S
aa N a X S S K
a a
            (5.1) 
1
2 2
1
* 1LL
N
a NW a X
W a
            (8.1) 
 
3. The general equilibrium analysis and comparative statics 
 
In this general equilibrium model there are eight endogenous variables: 
1 2 3, , , , , ,SW W r R X X X and UL and the same number of independent equations; namely, equations 
(1) – (4), (5.1), (6), (7) and (8 .1). This is an indecomposable production structure. r is obtained 
from (2) as *W is given. Plugging the value of r into (3) SW is found. So r and SW depend only on 
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commodity prices but not on factor endowments. Then ,W R and 2X are simultaneously solved 
from equations (1), (5.1) and (8.1).   
 
As sectors 1 and 2 use two common inputs, unskilled labour and capital, these can be classified 
in terms of factor intensities.1 It is sensible to assume that sector 2 is more capital-intensive than 
sector 1 with respect to unskilled labour in value sense. This implies that 
2 2 1 1( / * ) ( / )K L K La W a a Wa . 
 
3.1.  Effects of economic recession on informal wage and unemployment of unskilled labour 
 
In this section of the paper we are going to examine the consequences of economic recession in 
the skilled sector on the informal sector wage and urban unemployment of unskilled labour. An 
economic recession in the skilled labour market is captured in two ways. It leads to a decline in 
the price of the high-skill commodity, 3P , and a decrease in the emigration of skilled labour, 0S . 
 
Differentiating equations (1), (5.1) and (8.1) we respectively obtain 
1 1
ˆ ˆ 0L NW R             (9) 
1 1 2 2 2 0 3 3
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )KBW B R X B S B P             (10) 
*
4 5 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ 0LB W B R X             (11) 
where:  
1
1 1 0K NLB S  ; 02 3
0
( ) 0K
SB
S S
 

;
3 3
3
3
3
( ) 0K KS SK
S
S SB 

  ;        (12) 
1 1 *
4 1 2[ ( ) ] 0L LN NL LB S S     1 15 1[ ( )] 0;L LN NLB S S   *2 2
* 0.L L
W
W
    
 
Arranging equations (9) – (11) in a matrix notation we obtain 
                                                           
1 Note that apart from unskilled labour and capital sector 1 uses a specific factor, land.  
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1 1
1 1 2 2 0 3 3
*
4 5 2 2
ˆ         0       0
ˆˆ ˆ-B    B     ( )
ˆ          0  B     
L N
K
L
W
R B S B P
B X
 


    
          
         
       (13) 
 
Solving (13) by Cramer’s rule the following expressions are obtained.  
*
1 2 2 0 3 3
1 ˆˆ ˆ( )[ ( )]N LW B S B P   
        (14)                
*
1 2 2 0 3 3
1 ˆˆ ˆ( )[ ( )]N LR B S B P  
         (15) 
where 1 * 1 *2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2[{ ( ) }( ) ] 0NL L K K L K L LN L N N L KS S                    (16) 
Note that *2 1 2 1( ) 0L K K L       as sector 2 is capital-intensive vis-à-vis sector 1 with respect 
to unskilled labour in value terms. 
 
From (14) the following proposition can be easily established.  
Proposition 1: While a fall in the price of the high-skill commodity, 3P , raises the informal wage 
a drop in emigration of skilled labour, 0S , lowers the wage. 
 
Solving (13) one gets 
*
2 5 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 0
1 ˆˆ ˆ( )[{ ( ) }( )]L N N LX B B P B S      
      (17) 
          (–)    (+)                                (+)      (+)           
 
Differentiating equation (4), using (14) – (16) and simplifying the following expression can be 
obtained. 
1 *
2
1 1 1 3 3 2 0
ˆˆ ˆ( )[( )( )]NL L L N
SX B P B S     

       (18) 
                (–)                       (+)      (+)  
 
Again, differentiations of (6) and (3) yield 
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3
0
3 3 0
3 0
ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( )SK
S
S SX P S
S S
 

         (19) 
From (17) – (19) the following proposition readily follows. 
Proposition 2: A fall in the price of the high-skill commodity causes sector 2 to expand and both 
sectors 1 and 3 to contract. On the contrary, a decline in emigration of skilled labour causes both 
sectors 1 and 3 to expand but sector 2 to contract. 
 
Intuitions behind propositions 1 and 2 are fairly straightforward. A decline in the price of the 
high-skill commodity, 3P , causes sector 3 to contract. The skilled wage falls as its demand 
plummets. The contracting sector 3 releases capital to the other two sectors by this means 
producing a Rybczynski type effect in the subsector. Sector 2 expands while sector 1 contracts as 
the former sector is more capital-intensive than the latter in value sense. On the contrary, owing 
to a decline in emigration of skilled labour leads to an expansion of sector 3 as the effective 
endowment of skilled labour of the economy goes up. The expanding sector 3 draws capital from 
the other two sectors. The capital-intensive sector 2 contracts while the unskilled labour-
intensive sector 1 expands following a Rybczynski type effect. The retrenched unskilled workers 
from sector 2 move to sector 1; thereby depressing the informal (rural) wage rate. The return to 
the sector specific input, R , goes up.   
 
Subtraction of (7) from (8) yields 
2 2
*( 1) L U
W a X L
W
            (20) 
Differentiating (20) we find 
2 2 2
* *ˆ ˆ ˆ( 1)LU U L L
W WL X W
W W
      
Use of (14) and (17) and simplification lead to the following expression.  
1 1 *2
3 3 2 0 5 1 1 1 2
* *ˆˆ ˆ( )( )[( 1) {( 1) ( ) }]LLU U L N L LN NL L
W WL B P B S B S S
W W
          

      (21) 
                (–)    (+)      (+)          (+)    (+)                   (+)               (+)  
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Using (20) from (21) the following results can be easily obtained. 
(i) 
3
ˆ
( ) 0ˆ
UL
P
 if 0A   
(ii)   
0
ˆ
( ) 0ˆ
UL
S
 if 0A                                                  (22) 
where 1 1 21 2
*[ ( ) ( ) ]LU L LN NL L
WA S S
W
      
These results can be stated in terms of the following proposition.  
Proposition 3: A drop in the price of the high-skill product worsens the unemployment problem 
if 0A  . On the contrary, the urban unemployment problem of unskilled labour improves 
following a fall in emigration of skilled labour if 0A  . 
 
Proposition 3 can be intuitively explained in the following fashion. A fall in the price of the high-
skill commodity, 3P , raises both the rural sector wage and the output of sector 2 i.e. 2X . This 
leads to an increase in the number of jobs available in the urban sector. The expected urban wage 
for a prospective rural migrant, 2 2[ * /{1 ( / )}],U LW L a X rises as the probability of getting a job in 
this sector rises for every unskilled worker. This is the centrifugal force that drives the rural 
workers to move towards the urban sector. This paves the way for fresh migration from the rural 
to the urban sector. On the other hand, as the rural sector wage increases the centripetal force 
prevents rural workers from migrating into the urban sector. So in this case there are clearly two 
opposite effects working on determination of the size of the unemployed urban unskilled 
workforce. The centrifugal force dominates over the centripetal force under the sufficient 
condition that 0A   and the unemployment situation in the urban sector aggravates.  Finally, a 
fall in emigration of skilled labour lowers both the informal (rural) sector wage and the 
employment level of unskilled labour in the urban sector. So here both the centrifugal and 
centripetal forces are negative. However, the negative centripetal force outweighs the centrifugal 
force and the unemployment level of unskilled labour falls under the sufficient condition , 0A  .  
 
 
 
11 
 
3.2. Effects of economic recession on welfare of unskilled labour 
 
We are now going to analyze the effects of economic recession in the skilled sector on the 
welfare of the unskilled workers. Unskilled workers in different sectors of the economy earn 
different wages. The income distribution of the unskilled workers is given as follows.  
Wage rate:                  W                                  *W                          0  
Employment:       1 1 1( )LL a X                    2 2 2( )LL a X                     UL  
As the wage incomes of the different groups of unskilled workers differ, there is a positive Gini -
coefficient, G , of the income distribution of the unskilled workers.  
 
The welfare measure of Sen (1974), defined as the per-capita income multiplied by one minus 
the Gini-coefficient of the income distribution, is an appropriate measure of welfare of the 
unskilled workers. LetV be the social welfare measure of Sen (1974) which is given as follows.  
(1 )V Y G             (23) 
whereY is the average wage income of all the unskilled workers. We note that  
2 2 1 1* L LY W a X Wa X           (24) 
Using (7) and (8) from (24) we find that  
Y W             (25) 
Also 2 1 2 1( * ) *U UYG L L W W L L W L L W           (26) 
Using (23), (25) and (26) and simplifying we can write2 
1[1 (1 )]UV W L L             (27) 
Differentiating (27) the following proposition can be proved. 3 
Proposition 3: A drop in emigration of skilled labour lowers welfare of unskilled workers 
if 1 11 ( )N LN NLS S   . On the contrary, a decrease in the price of the high-skill commodity may 
improve welfare of unskilled workers if 2 1 11 2
* ( ) ( )N LN NL
W L S S
W
   .   
                                                           
2 See appendix I. 
3 See appendix III. 
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It should be noted that the conditions as stated in proposition 3 are only sufficient ones. The 
results may hold under alternative conditions as well.  
 
 
4.  Policy implications of results and concluding remarks  
 
The current economic recession though originated in developed countries, has started to bite the 
economies of even many developing countries. India is no exception. Rates of economic growth 
have fallen sharply and massive job losses and increasing poverty are all shaking the economic 
foundation of these countries. The developed countries have desperately fallen back upon 
monetary and fiscal measures for getting out of the crises. Besides, in a bid to protect domestic 
jobs they have laid off numerous migrant workers and restricted the entry of new skilled 
migrants into the country. This protectionist policy on the part of developed nations adds to the 
dismay of the developing countries.  In this backdrop this paper has examined the implications of 
economic recession in the high-skill sector on the wellbeing of the informal sector workers in 
terms of a three-sector Harris-Todaro model with an urban high-skill sector. A fall in the world 
price of the high-skill commodity and a drop in emigration of skilled labour are found to produce 
dissimilar effects on the unskilled workforce. Both the average wage and urban unemployment 
of unskilled labour increase following a reduction in the price of the high-skill product while a 
drop in emigration of skilled labour produces exactly the opposite effects on the informal wage 
and unemployment. Given these effects in order to protect the interest of the weaker section of 
the workforce the country should protect its unskilled labour-intensive sectors (sector 1) and 
resort to a price subsidy policy which would not only increase the informal (rural) sector wage 
but also lower the urban unemployment of unskilled labour. The policy, therefore, is expected to 
result in an unequivocal improvement in the wellbeing of the poorer group of the working 
population.  
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Appendix I: Derivation ofV function 
 
Using (25), (26) equation (23) may be rewritten as follows.  
2 1 2 1( * ) *U UV W L L W W L L W L L W      
   2 1 1 2*( ) ( )U UW L W L L WL L L      
  2 1 1 2*( ) ( )U UW L W L L WL L L      
2 2 1 2*(1 ) ( )UV W L W L WL L L                  (obtained after using (7)) 
Using (8.1) and simplifying we get 
1[1 (1 )]UV W L L             (27) 
 
Appendix II: Derivations of expression for 1ˆL and 2Lˆ  
 
Employment in sector 1,denoted 1L is given ` 
1
1 1 1
1
( )LL
N
a NL a X
a
            (A.1) 
Differentiating (A.1) one obtains 
1 1
1ˆ
ˆ ˆ( )( )LN NLL S S W R               (A.2) 
(Note that 1 1( ) 0LL LNS S  ) 
Using (14) and (15) equation (A.2) may be rewritten as follows.  
 
1 1 *
1 1 2
1 2 0 3 3
( )( ) ˆˆ ˆ( )N L LN NL LS SL B S B P    

       (A.3) 
                         (–) 
 
So a decrease in the price of the high-skill commodity ( 3P ) lowers the rural sector employment 
of unskilled labour, 1L , while a fall in emigration of skilled labour ( 0S ) raises 1L .  
 
Employment in sector 2, denoted 2L , is given by 
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2 2 2LL a X            (A.4) 
Differentiation of (A.4) yields 
2 2
ˆ ˆL X            (A.5) 
(Note that 2ˆ 0La  as ˆ 0R  ) 
From (A.2) and (17) it follows that  
*
2 5 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 0
1 ˆˆ ˆ( )[{ ( ) }( )]L N N LL B B P B S      
      (A.6) 
        (–)                        (+)  
 
Therefore, a decrease in the price of the high-skill commodity ( 3P ) raises the urban employment 
of unskilled labour, 2L , while a fall in emigration of skilled labour ( 0S ) lowers 2L .  
 
Appendix III: Effects of changes in 3P and 0S on V  
 
1
1 1
0 0 0 0
( ) ( )[1 (1 )] (1 )( ) ( )UU U
dL dLdV dW L L W L WL
dS dS dS dS
           (A.7) 
               (+)       (+)                                                      ( –) 
From (A.7) it follows that 
0
( ) 0dV
dS
 if 11
0 0
(1 )( ) ( ) 0U U
dL dLL L
dS dS
          (A.8) 
Using (21) and (A.3) from (A.8) it can be shown that 
0
( ) 0dV
dS
 if 1 11 ( )N LN NLS S           (A.9) 
 
Differentiating (27) with respect to 0S we get 
1
1 1
3 3 3 3
( ) ( )[1 (1 )] (1 )( ) ( )UU U
dL dLdV dW L L W L WL
dP dP dP dP
           (A.10) 
               (–)       (+)                                                      (+) 
From (A.10) it follows that 
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3
( ) 0dV
dP
 if 11
3 3
(1 )( ) ( ) 0U U
dL dLL L
dP dP
          (A.11) 
Using (21) and (A.3) from (A.11) one finds that 
3
( ) 0dV
dP
 if 2 1 11 2
* ( ) ( )N LN NL
W L S S
W
          (A.12) 
 
 
